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Abstract The aim of this paper is to retrace the history of genetic patents, analyzing 
the metaphors used in the public debate, in patent offices, and in courtrooms. I have 
identified three frames with corresponding metaphor clusters: the first is the 
industrial frame, built around the idea that DNA is a chemical; the second is the 
informational frame, assembled around the concept of genetic information; last is the 
soul frame, based on the idea that DNA is or contains the essence of the individual.  
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1. Foreword: when law meets science 
Science and law have a complicated relationship, and often face communication 
problems – if not quarrels – for example when trying to “bring together” psychiatric, 
and more recently neurosciences and criminal law (see for example GAZZANIGA 
2008) or biotechnologies and food safety policies (see for example TAGLIABUE 
2015).  
Why this awkward situation? An easy answer is: because lawyers don’t know 
science and scientists don’t know law. This is true – in most circumstances – but it’s 
also too simple. We must also say that in some situations the law must ignore 
science, because the aim of the law is to regulate human conflicts, contrasts that 
arise, and need to be resolved, using ordinary knowledge and thus ordinary language. 
For example, in the Nix v. Hedden case, the US Supreme Court decided that 
tomatoes should be classified as a vegetable rather than a fruit, using the ordinary 
meaning of the words “fruit” and “vegetable”, instead of the scientific meaning.  
Moreover, in law we may encounter legal fictions, which are facts assumed or 
created by courts in order to apply a legal rule. Legal fictions can be contrary to 
science, for example considering electricity – a flow of electric charge for physics – a 
material thing, and this in order to apply the law on goods.  
In this complex picture, we have metaphors. Metaphors used in scientific research
1
, 
metaphors used in the communication of science, metaphors used by lawyers in their 
argumentation. Metaphors that can facilitate communication between scientists, 
lawyers, and the general public, but that can also be misleading.  
                                                          
1
 The scientific language is highly metaphorical; see Hallyn 2014. 
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In this paper, I will focus on a particular class of metaphors: those built around 
DNA
2
 in the debate about genetic patents, with the aim of developing a brief 
metaphorical history of DNA patents from the 1970s to the Myriad case in 2013.  
 
 
2. Before the molecular biology 
This brief history starts in the 1970s with US patent number 3,710,511 (Procedures 
for use of genic male sterility in production of commercial hybrid maize), filed in 
1971 and granted in 1973. But to understand the importance of this patent for our 
history, we need to go back in time to the beginning of the 20th century. At this time, 
the molecular basis of heredity was almost unknown and information theory – the 
importance of which will be specified later – was yet to come, and in order to avoid 
the taint of old hypotheses, such as Darwin’s gemmules or Weissman’s determinants, 
the Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909 introduced the new and, supposedly, 
theory-free word ‘gene’. Perhaps as a consequence of the mysterious nature of the 
gene, we have the diffusion of the metaphor of gene-action (KELLER 2000): the 
gene is “something” whose action caused a specific trait in the organism (and the 
transmission of this trait to descendants). The trait caused by the gene in fact defined 
the gene, because the presence of the trait (in the individual or in her relatives) was 
the only thing that was known. This concept is often called, in contraposition to the 
molecular gene (i.e. a gene defined by properties of the DNA molecule), the 
Mendelian gene (HULL 1974, DUPRÉ 2004, CALVERT et al. 2011) or operational 
gene (BURIAN 2000); because of the dependency of this concept on the phenotype 
(the observable properties of the organism), in this paper I use the term phenotypic 
gene.  
Before the discovery of the role and structure of DNA, we had only phenotypic 
genes; but we should not think that the advent of the molecular gene and the ability 
to discover the DNA sequence of a gene has obliterated the phenotypic gene: this 
concept is still present in all situations where the molecular nature of a gene is 
unknown or useless. This is true in particular for mendelian traits (such as, in 
humans, blood type or albinism) that depend on a single gene acting in accordance 
with the dominant and recessive rules taught in every school.  
The genic sterility of the aforementioned patent refers to a phenotypic gene. In the 
description of the patent we read that «an understanding of the specific chemical 
nature and operation of the DNA which comprises the genes of chromosomes is not 
essential to an understanding of the present invention», and this because «it is 
sufficient to note that the DNA which comprises each gene of a chromosome is 
capable of directing cell metabolic functions in a particular manner» (PATTERSON 
1971: 2). 
So the first genetic patents were not, strictly speaking, DNA patents but phenotypic 
patents based on the gene-action metaphor.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 “Built around” in the sense that – using the terminology of the conceptual theory of metaphors 
(LAKOFF et al. 1980) – I will consider not only metaphors where DNA is in the target frame (such as 
“DNA is the blueprint of the organism”) but also metaphors where DNA is in the source frame (such 
as “Quality is in the firm’s DNA”). 
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3. Patenting a chemical substance 
The 1940s and 50s, with the discovery of the role
3
 and structure of DNA
4
, saw the 
development of a new gene concept based on a new metaphor: the genetic program.  
This change was made possible by the development of information theory, namely 
the discovery that information is a measurable quantity that we can mathematically 
analyze, studying in particular how this information is transmitted from a source to a 
destination through an emitter, a channel, and a receiver
5
. The text signaling the birth 
of information theory was The Mathematical Theory of Communication (SHANNON 
1948), published in 1948 by the mathematician and electrical engineer Claude E. 
Shannon. In this text there is no reference to genetics, but Shannon was interested in 
this new discipline: his PhD thesis of 1940 at MIT was entitled An Algebra for 
Theoretical Genetics, and in the summer of 1949 he annotated his notebook with 
estimates of the «bits storage capacity» of various items such as punched cards, 
phono records, and the «genetic constitution of man» (cited in GLEICK 2012: 230). 
With Shannon the genome became information measurable in bits or base pairs 
(bps), the unit now used in biology (for a critic analysis of this informational 
approach, see GRIFFITHS 2001 and LONGO et al. 2012).  
Shannon was, of course, an outsider in biology; nevertheless the information 
language was adopted by geneticists, starting with James Watson and Francis Crick, 
discoverers of the double helix structure of DNA. Their discovery was announced in 
April 1953 in a famous article published in Nature (WATSON et al. 1953b); a month 
later, the two scientists published a second article dedicated to the genetic 
implications of the double helix structure, writing: «It follows that in a long molecule 
many different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the 
precise sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical information» 
(WATSON et al. 1953a: 965). So it’s not surprising that the language of genetics is 
largely informational: DNA is transcribed into RNA and then translated into protein; 
we have a genetic code where every nucleotide triplet, or codon, corresponds to a 
specific amino acid, and if two triplets corresponds to the same amino acid, they are 
said to be synonymous codons, and so on.  
The double nature, molecular and informational, of DNA – which in reality is a 
metaphor, and quite a problematic one, as we will see in the next paragraph – is 
ignored by US, European, and Japanese patents offices, which established in 1988 
that DNA is no different from any other isolated biological material and «eligible for 
patents on the same basis as other chemical compounds»
6
. In other words, in the 80s 
there was no significant difference between DNA and a dye or a solvent. This 
attitude is coherent with, and perhaps a consequence of, the industrial metaphor of 
life developed in patent law in the 70s and culminating with the “life is largely 
chemistry” motto, as stated in the Chakrabarty case.  
The industrial metaphor of life, a sort of evolution of material mechanisms of the 
                                                          
3
 In 1944 by a team guided by Oswald Avery. 
 
4
 In 1953 by the Nobel Prize winners James Watson, Francis Crick and Maurice Wilkins, and the 
often forgotten Rosalind Franklin. 
 
5 
For a good introduction to information theory, see Gleick 2012. For a philosophical analysis, see 
Floridi 2011. 
 
6 
US, JAPAN, AND EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICES 1988, cited in Gold et al. 2010. 
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17th century, is connected with the development of genetic engineering.
7
 When, in 
the early 1970s, it concretized the ability to manipulate the genome by inserting 
DNA fragments from other species, along with an attitude of caution there was also a 
strong interest in commercial exploitation. Stanley N. Cohen at Stanford University 
and Herbert W. Boyer at the University of California, San Francisco developed the 
recombinant DNA technique (The history of the Stanley-Boyer patents is 
reconstructed in HUGHES 2001). From the scientific point of view, this technique 
was an extremely powerful research tool, since it allowed for isolating a single gene, 
but the two universities also noticed the economic potentials of this technology – it is 
estimated that the revenue of the three patents granted in 1980 is over 200 million 
dollars (FELDMAN et al. 2007) – and in 1974 filed a patent application.  
How to communicate to the general public, potential investors, and policy makers the 
importance and economic potential of recombinant DNA? William Carpenter, a 
Stanford student who was doing an internship at the Office of Technology Licensing, 
was appointed to investigate the possible commercial applications of the work of 
Cohen and Boyer. After meeting the two scientists, Carpenter presented a report that 
described the technology as a gene transplant able to transform bacteria in genetic 
factories for the production of substances otherwise difficult to obtain, such as 
insulin or viral proteins for the synthesis of vaccines. Harvard Magazine coined the 
term «bacterifacture» to indicate bacteria transformed in a factory. 
The industrial metaphor the cell is a factory spread rapidly, becoming one of the 
most common metaphors in science and in science communication (see REYNOLDS 
2007). The source frame of this metaphor offers several elements that explain its 
success, such as the specialization and division of labor, or the importance of the 
exchange of substances between the various units (factories and cells). Another very 
important element of the metaphor relates to the economic importance of the 
industrial sector, which in those years was going through a deep crisis in the United 
States. To maintain economic supremacy, the Carter and Reagan administrations 
(also) pointed to biotechnology, and the cell factory metaphor allowed them to 
consider this conversion as a sort of natural evolution of the economy, from real 
factories to genetic factories (COLYVAS 2007).  
If the cell is a factory, then we can patent it – with a product patent, not a process or 
use patent
8
. And this is what happened with US patent 4,259,444 for genetically 
modified bacteria invented by the Indian-American microbiologist Ananda M. 
Chakrabarty, a patent that arrived at the US Supreme Court which, in 1980, ruled in a 
5 to 4 decision that «a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject 
matter» (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 [1980]). The man behind this case 
was the patent attorney for General Electric Leo I. Malossi, which also claimed – in 
addition to the new method used to produce it, and a compound formed of a support 
substance and the bacterium – the genetically modified bacterium itself. This was 
contrary to the practice followed by the patent office and accepted by biotechnology 
companies. But General Electric was not a biotechnology company: its main 
                                                          
7
 The term «genetic engineering» dates back to the 1950s: the term appears to have been coined by the 
fiction writer Jack Williamson in his novel Dragon’s Island in 1951 – before the discovery of the 
double helix structure of the DNA (according to STABLEFORD 2004). 
 
8 
A product patent is a patent on the product itself, regardless of how it has been obtained; a process 
patent is a patent on a method or process and is not infringed by a product made by another process; a 
use patent is a patent on the use of the product for a specific purpose. 
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activities were in the field of engineering; the interest in biology was recent, and 
signaled a strong diversification due to a contraction of investment in the aerospace 
sector
9
.  
After the refusal of the US Patent Office Board of Appeals – based on the fact that a 
living organism, even if artificial, is not patentable because is not a new composition 
of matter – the Chakrabarty case went to the US Court of Custom and Patent 
Appeals, where it crossed a similar case, Bergy, concerning a patent on a purified 
strain of fungus. The court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Giles S. Rich, 
decided that the fact that microorganisms, as distinguished from chemical 
compounds, are alive is a distinction without legal significance (In the matter of the 
application of Malcolm E. Bergy et al., patent appeal no. 76–712. US Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, 563 F. 2d. 1031 [1977], p. 1038).  
The Solicitor General of the United States appealed the decision to the US Supreme 
Court, which vacated the decision and sent it back to the Court of Custom and Patent 
Appeals. In the new decision, Justice Rich was more explicit in applying the 
industrial frame to microorganisms, also using the aforementioned term 
“bacterifacture”. The conclusion was clear-cut: «In fact, we see no legally significant 
difference between active chemicals which are classified as ‘dead’ and organisms 
used for their chemical reactions which take place because they are ‘alive’. Life is 
largely chemistry» (In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979): 975).  
The Solicitor General also appealed this new decision, and in 1980 the Supreme 
Court definitively closed the Chakabarty case, ruling, as mentioned, that genetically 
modified microorganisms – and in general living organisms – are patentable: «The 
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between 
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions» (Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 [1980]: 313). 
DNA don’t escape this “industrial framing”, and this mechanistic metaphorization is 
apparent in one of the amicii curae sent to the Supreme Court: the Brief of Dr. 
George Pieczenik submitted on 29th January 1980. After describing the dualistic 
property of DNA, which is «definable like ordinary inanimate chemical compounds» 
and «capable of transforming susceptible host cells», Pieczenik used two interesting 
metaphors for the ability of DNA to alter the functional properties of cells: 
«analogously as an engine to its camshaft or an architect to his blueprints» 
(PIECZENIK 1980:7). Whether a camshaft or a blueprint, it is obvious that this 
frame is favorable to DNA patents.  
Talking of the “blueprint metaphor”, it is interesting to note that this is one of the 
most common metaphors used in scientific communication – and perhaps one of the 
most misleading: first of all because the linear relation between the blueprint and the 
construction (or the architect, in the Pieczenik’s version) is inadequate for the 
complex processes of genic expression, where only in rare circumstances do we see a 
perfect correspondence between one gene and one trait. Second, this metaphor has in 
its source frame concepts that are not intended to be projected into the target frame, 
but which are unlikely to be omitted by an inexperienced audience; most problematic 
is the idea that a blueprint has an author, a concept that if projected onto DNA 
conduct in line with the idea of intelligent design (on these limits of the blueprint 
metaphors, see PIGLIUCCI 2010 and PIGLIUCCI & BOUDRY 2010).  
 
 
                                                          
9
 The history of the Chakrabarty patent is reconstructed in Kevles 1994. 
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4. Patenting the soul 
The 1990s were the years of the Human Genome Project (HGP), the vast 
international initiative to sequence the entire genome of humanity started in 1990 and 
officially concluded in 2000 – though for some genes there was only a “working 
draft” – with a historic press conference at the White House.  
A short glance at the speech of US president Bill Clinton is sufficient to get an idea 
of what had changed from the genetic factories of the firsts DNA patents. After a 
comparison between the map of the human genome and the first map of America – 
«a map that defined the contours and forever expanded the frontiers of our continent 
and our imagination» –, Clinton pointed to the figure of Galileo Galilei and his 
discovery that we can use «the tools of mathematics and mechanics to understand the 
motion of celestial bodies». Galileo «learned the language in which God created the 
universe» – and now, thanks to the HGP, «we are learning the language in which 
God created life […] gaining ever more awe for the complexity, the beauty, the 
wonder of God’s most divine and sacred gift»10. 
This is a small example of what Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee call «the DNA 
mystique»: the «spiritual imagery [that] sets the tone for popular accounts of DNA, 
fueling narratives of genetic essentialism and giving mystical powers to a molecular 
structure» (NELKIN et al. 1996:40). DNA is not simply a molecule or a blueprint, 
but the essence of the individual, the source of the boundaries of personhood. On this 
view, DNA is the soul, in the Aristotelian sense of psyche, the form or plan of the 
individual – the analogy between the two is acknowledged for example by 
biophysicist Max Delbrück, who suggested that Aristotle should be posthumously 
awarded a Nobel Prize «For the discovery of the principle implied in DNA» 
(DELBRÜCK 1976) – and perhaps also in the Christian sense of an immortal 
animating principle «that bears the marks of good and evil: a man my look fine to 
outside world, but despite appearances, if he is evil, it will be marker in his genes» 
(NELKIN et al. 2004: 41).  
This reference to the true self of a person is one aspect of the social reception of 
genetic tests, often perceived as revelations of the real nature of a person, her past 
(with genealogical information) and future (with disease predisposition). In this 
regard, the soul metaphor is linked to the blood rhetoric that, in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, matched with class- and race prejudice and eugenics; but in the genomic 
era DNA is not only a factor of discrimination and segregation, but also an 
instrument of reconciliation and repair. Such is the case for the genetic test used by 
Las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (the grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo) to identify the 
children of the desaparecidos abducted by the military dictatorship in Argentina. 
Another interesting example is the ability of genetic ancestry tests – a consumer 
genetic test to find out the geographical origin of one’s family – to construct a 
genealogy for African Americans families lacking a traditional ancestral narrative 
(NELSON 2016).  
 
4.1. Genetic patents and slavery 
If DNA is the soul of a human being, holding the intellectual property
11
 of the human 
                                                          
10
 A transcript of the speech is available online at http://www.genome.gov/10001356/june-2000-
white-house-event/. 
 
11 
Intellectual property, which includes patents, copyright, trademarks, and other institutions, is a 
monopoly assigned by law; the idea of the possession of an intangible good is mostly metaphoric. 
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genome is equivalent to possessing a human being, i.e., slavery.  
The slavery argument has been raised a few times (and immediately rejected). It has 
been presented to the European patent office by some members of the European 
Parliament in opposition to the patent granted for the gene that encodes a particular 
human hormone, relaxin, capable of relaxing the uterus during childbirth. The 
response has been quite dry: the patents of genes confer no rights on individuals 
(Howard Florey/Relaxin; Oppositions by Fraktion der Grünen im Europäischen 
Parlament; Lannoye; EPO 6/1995 388). A similarly harsh rejection came from the 
US Patent office (USPTO) during the consultation for the new guidelines of 2001, 
which introduced more stringent criteria for genetic patents. An anonymous 
petitioner asked the USPTO to not accept any patents covering human genes because 
these patents constitute a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the reply was 
that patents have nothing to do with slavery (Federal Register/Vol. 66, No. 4).  
 
4.2. The common heritage argument 
The slavery argument has been less important than the common heritage argument, 
the idea of which is to apply the common heritage of humankind doctrine to the 
human genome. This is a principle of international law which holds that defined 
territorial areas – such as outer space or the sea bed – should be protected from 
exploitation by individual nation states or corporations. This principle is stated in the 
first article of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights, adopted unanimously and by acclamation in 1997: «The human 
genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well 
as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the 
heritage of humanity». 
The development of this idea is connected to the HGP, and became the most 
important argument against the filing of genetic patents from scientists involved in 
the project. The intellectual property of sequenced DNA became a conundrum and 
internal divergence on this topic lead, in 1992, to the resignation of James Watson as 
head of the project
12
.  
In the context of a publicly funded project (in fact the biggest publicly funded project 
ever) of basic research, it is difficult to disagree with this principle, but it’s important 
to examine whether the common heritage reference is a serious claim (as affirmed in 
STURGES 1999) or just a plea to the importance of the genome – such that the real 
common heritage of humankind is the Human Genome Project.  
The correct answer is the latter, at least when we read the aforementioned UNESCO 
declaration carefully: the genome is the heritage of humanity “in a symbolic sense”. 
The reason for this, as stated in the report (Document 29 C/21) is very simple: DNA 
is not a territorial area, but a resource present in practically every cell of every 
human being, such that an international management of this resource could violate 
the rights of individuals and groups, with compulsory exploitation. If the (time-
limited and partial) monopoly of a private company could be a problem, it’s unlikely 
that the solution would be a (unlimited) monopoly of some supranational institution. 
There are other problems too: the “human genome” is an abstract concept (we have 
individual genomes, with unique or rare mutations, and large sections of DNA shared 
with other species, including unicellular organisms); a preservation approach, part of 
the common heritage doctrine, could imply the impossibility of genetic therapy; last, 
                                                          
12
 On Watson’s resignation, see Roberts 1992; for an in-depth account, see Cook-Deegan 1996. 
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if the aim is to ban the intellectual property of DNA, this is the wrong approach, 
because the common heritage is compatible with private exploitation
13
.  
Given these difficulties, why is this argument so popular? Maybe because DNA is 
not only a chemical that embodies genetic information, but also the essence of the 
individual, what make me me and what make us humans and not chimpanzees.  
 
 
5. Patenting DNA as information 
The soul metaphor of DNA has shaped the opposition to genetic patents, with wide 
results in public opinion and research policies – many of the big research projects in 
genetics discourage patents (CONTRERAS 2011) – but small consequences for 
patents offices and courts, where the industrial metaphor of DNA remains standard 
and the idea of an untouchable genetic essence is largely unthinkable. Nevertheless, 
the development of bioinformatics and the widespread use of computers in the 
analysis of genetic sequences has led to some small digressions from this standard.  
 
5.1. Copyright and computers 
The scientific challenge is no longer the manipulation of the genome to create 
“genetic factories”, but the understanding of complex genetic functions or diseases. 
So, next to traditional genetic patents for DNA sequences used in the production of 
improved or novel organisms, we find patents covering the DNA used in diagnostic 
tests. Without the fence of the industrial metaphor, the intellectual property space 
opens up to other possibilities, such as copyright
14
.  
The idea of the use of copyright – a legal right conceived for creative work and the 
original expression of ideas – for the genome was introduced by the Nobel prize 
Walter Gilbert, who in 1987 announced his intention to create a company, the 
Genome Corporation, for sequencing human DNA and selling the information 
obtained
15
. Lacking utility, these sequences cannot be patented, but for Gilbert 
«someone worked it out and wrote it down – so the order of the letters is 
copyrightable, like a string of letters in a book» (ROBERTS 1987).  
Another analogy is drawn with pictures (a photo is copyrightable, though the scene 
in the photo is not) and, above all, computer programs; the common denominator is 
the idea that DNA is information. This reframing of DNA influenced, at least, one 
patent office: in 1995 we find an international patent application (number 
WO1996US05320) for the genome of the bacterium Haemophilus influenzae that 
does not concern the molecule, but the information of the sequence stored in an 
electronic format. The application, never approved, was withdrawn in 2005, so we 
can only speculate on what the consequences of this patent might have been. But it’s 
very likely that, if approved, the patent would not have covered genetic tests nor the 
creation of a genetically modified organism with part of the genome of the 
                                                          
13 
For a critique of the common heritage argument, see Resnik 2004 and Ossorio 2007; for an apology 
(and a defense of genetic patents), see Queloz 2015. 
 
14
 A patent is a limited duration (usually 20 years) right relating to an invention, granted by a patent 
office in exchange for public disclosure of the invention; copyright protects original works of 
authorship including literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works; copyright usually lasts for the life 
of the author plus 70 years. 
 
15 
For the free flow of knowledge, the copyright of DNA will be a disaster: no utility requirement, no 
evaluation of novelty, at least 70 years of protection instead of the 20 of patents. 
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bacterium, for example for the production of a vaccine. It would, however, have 
granted something even more important: the ability to analyze, with a computer, the 
genome of the bacterium.  
 
5.2. The European way: genetic information that performs its function 
Another minor deviation from the industrial frame is contained in the European 
directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, approved on 
May 12, 1998 after intense debate and the first proposal of the Council of the 
European Union being rejected, in 1995, by the European Parliament.  
Like almost all European laws, the directive is the result of numerous compromises, 
so article 5 establishes that «the human body […] and the simple discovery of one of 
its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute 
patentable inventions» unless «an element isolated from the human body […], 
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable 
invention» (Directive 98/44/EC, art. 5).  
A similar strategy of balancing different interests and sensibilities is detectable in 
article 9:  
 
The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of 
genetic information shall extend to all material […] in which the product in 
incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its 
function (Directive 98/44/EC, art. 9, emphasis mine). 
 
The aim is to limit the extent of genetic patents – where too-wide protection can 
harm competition and technological innovation –, but it is interesting that this 
limitation is achieved using the concept of genetic information. And it is not only 
DNA is considered, for intellectual property, genetic information rather than a 
chemical, but also genetic information with a function – and, most importantly, a 
function that is active.  
Practically, this means that the validity of a gene patent is limited to biologically 
active materials. For example, a Monsanto patent for a genetically modified soybean 
plant has no effect on the soybean meal produced by these plants, because the meal is 
«a dead material», as stated by the European Court of Justice (Monsanto Technology 
LLC v Cefetra BV and Others, Case C-428/08).  
 
5.3. The American way: the Myriad case 
The rules for gene patents were written, in Europe, by parliament; in the United 
States, conversely, the matter was established by judicial decision, in particular with 
the Myriad case
16
, where the Association for Molecular Pathology challenged certain 
claims in issued patents owned or controlled by Myriad Genetics that covered the 
isolated DNA sequences of two genes, BRCA1 and 2 and their main mutations, 
connected with breast and ovarian cancers (BRCA stands for BReast CAncer)
17
.  
The patents of these genes are particularly unpleasant for several reasons: Myriad 
have stolen the march on public research; breast cancer is a very delicate and 
                                                          
16
 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398 (569 U.S. ___ June 13, 2013). 
 
17
 In Europe, BRCA patent oppositions and appeals began in early 2001, but without worldwide 
attention and a real discussion about the patentability of the human genes. See Matthijs et al. 2013 for 
further details. 
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sensitive disease, and for some mutations, the BRCA test is highly predictive; not 
forgetting Myriad’s business model of exclusively offering diagnostic testing 
services, without licensees, and sending cease and desist letters also to universities. 
The cost of testing for BRCA1 and 2 is perceived as an obstacle for many women to 
take control of their lives
18
, so it is no surprise that standing alongside the plaintiff 
Association for Molecular Pathology is the American Civil Liberties Union.  
The case was heard in 2010 in the Southern District Court of New York, which ruled 
that none of the challenged claims were patent eligible. Myriad then appealed to the 
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which overturned the previous decision. 
As in the Chakrabarty case, there was an appeal to the Supreme Court, which 
remanded the case to the lower court, which did not change its opinion. So on 
September 25, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a second petition. On 
June 13, 2013, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s 
claims to isolated genes maintaining those on complementary DNA
19
.  
Despite some reference to what we have called the DNA mystique – in particular in 
some amicii curiae, where we read that «genetic code is a divine gift» 
(SCARNECCHIA et al. 2013) or that «DNA’s importance flows from its ability to 
encode and transmit the instructions for creating a human being» (WATSON 2013) – 
the key point of the case is whether isolated DNA is a patentable subject matter, i.e., 
if it is «made by man»
20
. The genomic DNA, present in the human chromosome, is 
of course natural and not patentable, but the isolated gene, artificially separated from 
the rest of the genetic material, could still be considered a natural phenomenon? And 
what about the complementary DNA (cDNA), that is, the sequence without 
noncoding sequences? The three courts, as stated, all answered differently: all natural 
(and thus not patentable) for the Southern District, all artificial (and thus patentable) 
for the Federal Circuit, isolated natural and cDNA artificial for the Supreme Court.  
These different evaluations are grounded in different visions of the nature of DNA, 
different conceptions that are manifest in the three decisions, all containing a short 
introduction of biochemistry that is very interesting to read in the search for 
metaphors.  
The Southern District’s decision focuses on the informational aspects of DNA, using 
a great many linguistic and essentialist metaphors, in particular in parts III-A and B 
and, of course, in the conclusion: «This informational quality is unique among the 
chemical compounds found in our bodies, and it would be erroneous to view DNA as 
no different than other chemicals previously the subject of patents» (Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09-cv-4515, 94 
USPQ2d 1683 [S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010]: 122-123).  
If the only thing that matters is the meaning of the sequence of nucleotide, it is 
obvious that this meaning is the same in genomic DNA, in isolated DNA, and even 
in cDNA, where we have suppressed meaningless sequences.  
For the Federal Circuit, DNA is a chemical: the informational dimension is simply 
dropped: «We recognize that biologists may think of molecules in terms of their 
uses, but genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best 
                                                          
18
 See for example the testimony of Angelina Jolie on her mastectomy: Jolie 2013. 
 
19 
The case also involved other claims that are not taken into account here. 
 
20
 Patentable subject matter may include «anything under the sun that is made by man», as affirmed by 
the Supreme court quoting the testimony of Pasquale Joseph Federico, a high-ranking official of the 
US Patent Office, before a House subcommittee in 1951. 
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described in patents by their structures rather than their functions» (Association for 
Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F 3d 1303: 
45). And if it is a chemical, the isolation of the molecule from the rest of the 
chromosome is sufficient to consider it human-made and thus patentable.  
For the Supreme court DNA is information, and confirmation of this is found in the 
patent’s claims: 
 
Myriad’s claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor 
do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of 
a particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the 
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398 [569 U.S. ___ June 13, 
2013]: 14)  
 
Because the genetic information doesn’t change with the isolation of a section of 
DNA, the claims on isolated BRCA genes are invalid.  
However, cDNA is patentable, despite the fact that cDNA «contains the same 
protein-coding information found in a segment of natural DNA» (Ivi: 1). At first 
sight, it seems that DNA is information when it comes to isolated genetic material, 
but a chemical when it comes to cDNA (this is, for example, the interpretation of 
DOLIN 2013). But the problem could be the ambiguity of the term ‘information’, 
because cDNA contains the same “protein-coding information”, but does not contain 
the same “raw information”, because the (human-made) removal of noncoding 
sequences changes the text of the DNA.  
Is interesting to note that the US patent office, in the new examination guideline, 
disregards the Supreme court’s indication that DNA should be treated as information, 
interpreting the decision in the old frame of chemical substances
21
.  
 
 
6. Conclusion: and now something completely different 
We have seen how the first economically important applications of genetics, in the 
industrial frame of genetic factories, has smoothly taken intellectual protection in the 
direction of industrial patents. This solution, with the development of biotechnology 
and a tendency to consider the informational aspect of DNA, has shown its limits – 
nevertheless without a true abandonment of the patent system.  
A way of overcoming genetic patents could, however, come from the new field of 
synthetic biology, the design, or re-design, of new biological parts, devices, and 
systems. This field represents a puzzle when it comes to the question of intellectual 
property (RAI et al. 2007), not only regarding patent and copyright, but also sui 
generis database rights, the public domain, and the commons. All the currently 
available options come from the computer industry, because the most common 
metaphors used for synthetic biology come from this industry: the organism is a 
computer, DNA is the operating system of this computer, the biotechnologist is the 
software engineer who writes new code or hacks an old one, and so on (for a deep 
analysis of the metaphors used in synthetic biology, see HELLSTEN et al. 2011).  
If we can learn something from the past, maybe it is that these solutions will have 
some limits. Perhaps what we need is something completely different: a new 
intellectual property right expressly designed for DNA, which accounts for the 
                                                          
21
 The same chemical frame is used by the Department of Justice in their amicus curiae, invoking a 
“magic microscope” able to look deep inside cells and find any natural molecule within them. 
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complex characteristics of genetic material and the various instances of stakeholders, 
from biotechnology industries to activist groups. In a similar, but perhaps more 
balanced way to what happened in the USA with the introduction of plant patents for 
asexually reproducing varieties of plants (KEVLES 2007). But at the moment this 
solution seems utopian.   
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